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Introduction
Expeditionary Economics addresses means for 
properly enabling private sector led growth in 
transitional environments.1 In order to invest and 
grow, the private sector requires some modicum 
of stability and institutional reliability. Transitional 
environments, however, are often typified by a 
political economy within which powerful non-
state actors develop inappropriate alliances with 
state officials and run illicit enterprises that violate 
the rights of their fellow citizens and suffocate 
licit entrepreneurial growth. Where essential 
stabilization steps required to fight these alliances 
are neglected, a “transition gap” arises, and the 
state, increasingly viewed by its citizens as corrupt 
and ineffective, loses legitimacy. This paper argues 
that stabilizing forces have strategic, moral, and 
legal obligations to immediately establish effective 
rule of law institutions in the wake of interventions. 
More specifically, stabilizing forces must establish 
(or support) institutions that are capable of 
preventing, investigating, and punishing corruption 
and criminality. To date, these obligations have not 
been adequately recognized or resourced. 
The first section of this paper addresses the 
strategic and moral aspects of closing the transition 
gap. It argues that immediate action on rule of law 
is required to establish the institutional foundations 
that are necessary for stabilization and economic 
growth. As noted above, where state institutions 
do not adequately enforce the law, criminal 
networks that subvert essential state functions 
and violate the rights of citizens will develop. This 
criminalization undermines counterinsurgency 
efforts by depriving stabilizing forces of the ability 
to responsibly hand over power to host institutions 
and retarding the development of a robust, licit 
economy. It also deprives the local citizens of the 
dignity and security that any stabilizing force must 
seek to establish and protect. The first section also 
will suggest specific actions that can strengthen 
rule of law in the early stages of stabilization.
The second section reviews aspects of 
the international jurisprudence applicable in 
occupation environments. It offers a novel 
argument that in situations of occupation, a 
combined reading of international humanitarian 
and international human rights law implies a 
legal obligation to close the transition gap. While 
there is some overlap between international 
humanitarian law (specifically here we will be 
dealing with laws of occupation) and human 
rights law (a body of various treaties recognizing 
fundamental human rights), they often are dealt 
with in legal literature as two entirely separate 
bodies that have little bearing on one another. 
The second section asserts, however, that the 
responsibility to respect and ensure public 
order and civil life, contained in international 
humanitarian law, incorporates human rights 
obligations to protect life, privacy, property, and 
personal integrity. This combined set of obligations 
requires that stabilizing forces establish adequate 
rule of law institutions. In making this assertion, 
the section examines the linkages between 
corruption and human rights violations, and 
explores detailed legal norms that, in addition to 
strategic and moral grounds, provide a basis for 
immediate action against corruption and organized 
criminality in transitional environments.
This paper also recognizes that international 
authorities often do not acknowledge that an 
occupation exists, or even clearly describe the 
situation and the authorities that do exist.2 The 
third section of this paper, therefore, argues that 
international negotiators must be very clear about 
the authorities that exist in stabilization situations 
and provide adequate law enforcement authorities 
even where occupation law is not accepted. 
Furthermore, international forces should work with 
host-society actors to develop means of fighting 
corruption and organized crime, even where 
their authority to directly counter such activities 
are constrained. The section uses Afghanistan 
as a specific case study, proposing ways that 
international actors can enable local citizens to 
enforce their own legal rights against corrupt 
1. I use “transitional environments” here to express the range of situations in which international forces have intervened to stabilize a situation.
2. An occupation was never admitted to exist, for example, in Afghanistan.
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3. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, “Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan,” Report Number ISP-I-08-09 (2008), 5,http://oig.
state.gov/documents/organization/106946.pdf.
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government officials or powerful nongovernmental 
actors in the absence of direct legal authority to 
prevent, investigate, and punish. 
Ultimately, the suggestions expressed herein 
provide guidance on how to adequately close the 
transition gap. Stabilizing authorities must establish 
or support local institutions that are capable of 
preventing, investigating, and punishing a host 
of wrongs that are prevalent in post-conflict 
countries. Admittedly, this reading of strategic, 
moral, and legal obligations puts added burdens 
on stabilizing forces. This essay, therefore, implores 
decision makers to carefully consider the full 
responsibilities they have in initiating interventions, 
and to properly authorize and resource 
stabilization forces to satisfy those responsibilities.
Part I. 
Establishing Rule of Law
One immediate imperative to stabilizing post-
conflict environments is ensuring that the criminal 
economy, like a host of weeds in a garden, does 
not suffocate the growth of licit commercial and 
social activities. Urgent action is needed to kill such 
“weeds” before they even begin to grow. This 
action requires the establishment or support of law 
enforcement and judicial bodies that can prevent, 
investigate, and punish corruption and criminality.
Military commanders may rightly contend that 
in the early stages of an intervention, they have 
too many challenges to deal with, and that policing 
operations focused on illicit power structures would 
divert resources from other vital security functions. 
The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
shown, however, that such rule of law functions 
are inseparable from the goals associated with 
stabilization operations. This paper does not 
dispute military security priorities or resourcing 
decisions, but merely posits that future planning 
should recognize the full scope of post-conflict 
needs, discussed below, and properly plan to 
include a substantial law enforcement component 
in stabilization operations.
Foremost, stabilizing forces must lay out a clear 
rule of law strategy with measurable timelines and 
goals. In Afghanistan, part of the rule of law 
problem has involved the lack of a coherent 
strategy, and consequently, a coherent means of 
measuring success. Commenting on rule of law 
programs in 2008, the State Department’s Office 
of the Inspector General noted that “ … it is often 
not clear how, or even if, [Rule of Law] efforts are 
being measured for success.”3 The assessment goes 
on to observe that “after almost five years of donor 
activities in Afghanistan, the baseline knowledge 
about the formal justice sector outside of Kabul 
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Table 1: USAID Obligations for  
Afghanistan FY02–FY07
(millions US$)
Sector 2002-2007 %
Agriculture 304 5%
Alternative Development 544 9%
Roads 1,438 24%
Power 626 11%
Water 53 1%
Economic Growth 321 5%
PRTs 298 5%
ARTF 365 6%
NSP 50 1%
GiROA Support 19 0%
Democracy/Governance 375 6%
Elections 52 1%
Rule of Law 64 1%
Education 343 6%
Health 422 7%
Program Support 83 1%
IDPs 141 2%
Food Assistance 376 6%
Total $5,874
Source: http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/budget 
(corrected sum)
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remains fairly rudimentary.”4 Moreover, as can be 
seen in Table I, for roughly the first five years of U.S. 
engagement in Afghanistan, only 1 percent of the 
USAID budget was obligated to Rule of Law 
programming. The picture that emerges is one of  
ad hoc development of programs focused on 
immediately accessible institutions, with potentially 
limited impact on the majority of the country’s 
population. The lesson: it is essential that stabilizing 
forces enter a country with a clear strategy to stand 
up critical rule of law institutions from the outset. 
The following section first will dispel the myth 
that corruption is an inevitable cultural characteristic 
of developing countries. It then will describe how 
post-conflict environments develop a political 
economy that is uniquely susceptible to corruption 
and organized criminality. Given that susceptibility, 
this section then will address the need to fight 
corruption with adequate law enforcement programs 
from the onset of stabilization operations. It will 
close by addressing means of deconstructing corrupt 
institutions once they already are established.
Corruption is Not Inevitable
One of the classic red herrings in stabilization 
discussions is the idea that corruption is an 
engrained, unavoidable cultural attribute that 
cannot be changed. However, one needs only 
a handful of conversations with the victims of 
corruption throughout the developing world to 
understand the deep frustration they feel toward 
corrupt officials. Consider, for example, a darkly 
ironic story from Afghanistan: A U.S. aid contractor 
organized a kite festival which was intended to 
help educate Afghan children about rule of law 
issues.5 As children rushed to booths to pick up 
the free kites, Afghan police beat them away and, 
in some instances, actually stole the kites for their 
own personal use.6 When confronted, a senior 
Afghan officer excused the behavior of a policeman 
who was loading kites into his own truck saying 
it was permissible since the man was more than a 
policeman, but was also his personal bodyguard.7 
An article published the next day in The New York 
Times discussed the story of an American shipment 
of computers intended for Iraqi schoolchildren that 
had vanished from the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.8 
The problem here is not with inimitable cultures 
of corruption, but with the impunity that allows 
certain people to act “above the law.” 
4. Ibid. 
5. Rod Nordland, “Afghan Equality and Law, but With Strings Attached,” The New York Times, September 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/09/25/world/asia/25kite.html?_r=3&hpw.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Gift for Iraqi Students Offers a Primer on Corruption,” The New York Times, September 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html?_r=1&hp.
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Table 2: Integrity Watch Afghanistan: 
National Corruption Survey 2010
What is the Biggest Problem the  
Government Needs to Address?
Insecurity 32%
Unemployment  23%
Corruption  22%
Illegal Drugs  6%
Access to Justice  3%
Armed Groups  3%
Education Access  2%
Lack of Development  2%
Water/Electricity  2%
Access to Health  1%
Lack of Political Freedoms  0%
Other  4%
Is there sufficient government performance  
in addressing corruption?
Yes 23%
No 66%
Don’t Know 11%
Source: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “Afghan 
Perceptions and Experience of Corruption: A National 
Survey 2010” available at: http://www.iwaweb.org/
corruptionsurvey2010/Main_findings_files/IWA%20
National%20Corruption%20Survey%202010.pdf
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To be more specific, it is quite easy for these 
children to understand that they have been 
wronged. They are not subject to overarching 
cultural norms which tell them that such corruption 
is proper and acceptable. They see, quite clearly, 
that these actions constitute gross violations. As 
the survey responses in Table 2 demonstrate, it 
is no more difficult for their parents, after being 
forced to pay bribes to judges, or having family 
members beaten or suffer worse indignities at 
the hands of government officials, to recognize 
that something is seriously amiss. Any random 
conversation in a Kabul café or Baghdad office 
can elicit such stories, usually followed by pleas for 
justice. Likewise, it is no more difficult for hopeful 
entrepreneurs, facing the threat of kidnapping or 
other extortion, and without legal recompense, to 
recognize that such an environment is no place to 
invest resources. 
So why, then, does comprehensive corruption 
surface? Such environments do not simply emerge 
overnight. The first step to enabling licit economic 
activity is for stabilizing forces to understand how 
such criminal ecosystems emerge.
Closing the Transition Gap: The 
Necessity of Immediate Action
Violent conflict often leads to the breakdown of 
state institutions. As armed groups battle within 
a certain territory, governing institutions may be 
unable to provide services in the midst of violence, 
or may be totally destroyed.9 Thus, a “transition 
gap” is created wherein government institutions 
fail to take adequate responsibility for enforcing 
the law. This gap creates opportunities for the 
malevolent to develop sophisticated networks with 
which they can pursue illicit activity.
While some actors may operate simply to provide 
for the fundamental needs of society, others pursue 
profit through a number of illicit endeavors that 
the transition gap enables.10 As early as April 2003, 
one month after the United States invaded Iraq, for 
example, reports showed that criminal organizations 
had begun to develop around the main population 
centers of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul.11 By July, 
many of these organizations already had developed 
sophisticated means for arms and drug smuggling 
in and out of the country.12 These organizations 
inevitably will develop ties with local governing 
institutions, allowing them protection, access to 
resources, and additional opportunities for illicit 
profit.13 Such trends are not unique to Iraq.
Indeed, evidence of the commonality of conflict 
economies’ criminalization is overwhelming. 
One Bosnia expert described how the smuggling 
networks that were critical to various wartime 
activities transitioned seamlessly into profit centers 
during the peace, pursuing a number of illicit 
functions.14 Similar evidence abounds of conflict 
inequities throughout Asia and Africa.15 
One of the most serious mistakes stabilizing 
forces can make is discounting the likelihood of 
the organized criminalization of post-conflict 
economies. Ignoring such developments sets a path 
for subsequent institutional and social trends that 
lead to profound corruption and, potentially, the 
inability of a state to sustain governing institutions 
that can reliably provide for its citizens’ needs. Iraq 
and Afghanistan reveal the dangers of ignoring the 
transition gap. 
9. Brock Dahl, “The Business of War: How Criminal Organizations Perpetuate Conflict and What To Do About It,” Colloquium 2, no. 1 (March 2009): 
3, https://coin.harmonieweb.org/Knowledge%20Center/Colloquium/Dahl.pdf.
10. Brock Dahl, “The Quiet Enemy: Defeating Corruption and Organized Crime,” Military Review (March-April 2010): 78.
11. Phil Williams, “Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 1 (2009):119. 
12. Mark Fritz, “Arms and Drug Smuggling Rise as Crime Gets Organized in the New Iraq,” Associated Press, July 5, 2003, 1, quoted in Robert E. 
Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption in Iraq,” 15 International Peacekeeping 
15, no. 3 (2008): 31.
13. Peter Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,” International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004): 44.
14. Ibid.
15. Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict,” in Corruption, Global Security, and World Order, ed. Robert I. 
Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 66−95.
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Despite its authority and control, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S. government 
organization established in 2003 to guide Iraq 
from conflict to stability, seemed unconcerned 
with any comprehensive policing strategy, and saw 
crime merely as an Iraqi responsibility.16 Indeed, 
a U.S. Central Command official proclaimed in 
2003 that the military would not “be a police 
force,” and around the same time a British military 
commander responded to questions about looting 
by asking, “Do I look like a policeman?”17 Rather 
than going in with any plan to fill the policing 
vacuum, the U.S. approach in 2003 was contingent 
upon a “temporary reconstitution” of the then-
existing police force.18 The exploding criminality 
that followed the invasion, described above, 
demonstrates this plan’s ineffectiveness.19 Indeed, 
it was not until 2006, three years after the initial 
invasion in Iraq, that any prominent U.S. official 
called for a more intense focus on corruption and 
criminality.20 
Similar mistakes were made in Afghanistan, 
where the United States relied on a small group of 
military and intelligence operators to support the 
Northern Alliance, a loosely confederated band 
of Afghan militias.21 In the years that followed 
the toppling of the Taliban, the warlords who led 
the alliance were allowed to divvy up the country 
into their own spheres of influence.22 Many of 
those same warlords now run roughshod over the 
Afghan people and control various aspects of the 
licit and illicit Afghan economy.23 
Lamentably, as indicated in Table 3, despite 
years of significant international presence in both 
countries, Afghanistan and Iraq continue to rank 
amongst the most corrupt countries in the world. 
Stabilizing forces, therefore, must recognize 
that law enforcement functions are integral to 
stabilization operations, and the development 
community as a whole (including the military) 
must immediately stand up rule of law institutions 
and then gradually transition such institutions 
over to local authority.24 The military must, 
consequently, develop groups that are capable 
of both adjudicating and enforcing law in these 
early stages of stabilization. Such law enforcement 
requirements force policymakers to acknowledge 
that intervention is a resource intensive process and 
cannot be done on the cheap. 
Specific Institutions
Though the requirements of such a policing force 
are beyond the scope of this paper, the RAND 
Corporation has produced an excellent study on the 
16. Williams, 116.
17. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Law and Order: The Military Doesn’t Do Police Work. Who Will?”, Washington Post, April 13, 2003, sec. B-.
18. Ibid.
19. See Dahl, “The Business of War,” 3; Dahl, “The Quiet Enemy,” 78.
20. Mark Gregory, “The Failure of Iraq’s Reconstruction,” BBC News, November 10, 2006, accessed March 14, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/6132688.stm.
21. Gary Schroen. First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Presidio Press, 2005).
22. For a telling example, see Doug Feith’s recounting of a story about a provincial warlord named Pacha Khan, whom the United States allowed 
to challenge the authority of the nascent Afghan government. Doug Feith, War and Decision (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), 140−45; 
see also Brock Dahl, “Corruption in Afghanistan,” National Review Online, November 16, 2009, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/228612/
corruption-afghanistan/brock-dahl.
23. Aryn Baker, “The Warlords of Afghanistan,” Time, February 12, 2009, accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1879167,00.html.
24. Where reliable institutions already exist, stabilizing forces must provide adequate support to ensure operational effectiveness.
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Table 3: Transparency International, Rank in 
Corruption Perceptions Index Out of  
World Countries
2007 2008 2009 2010
Afghanistan 172 176 179 176
Iraq 178 178 176 175
Source: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi
Surveys vary in sample size, but there are generally 
around 180 countries.
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need to create a “Stability Police Force.”25 Suffice it 
to say, however, that such a body must be capable 
of policing the full spectrum of criminal activities. 
Organized crime groups are dependent on more 
sophisticated public corruption and illicit financing 
schemes to survive and grow. A stability police 
force, therefore, must work across agency lines 
with the U.S. military and civilian law enforcement 
communities to be able to stem illegal activities and 
train host country agencies to do the same. 
The intervening forces also must be prepared 
to set up courts and prisons in order to complete 
the entire law enforcement cycle. This may not 
require creating entirely new institutions, but 
rather reinforcing with experts and resources 
those local institutions weakened by conflict. 
Care should be taken to fully account for local 
dynamics in structuring such support. Political 
pressures, for example, currently reign over the 
Afghan justice system, with judges openly admitting 
that they receive demands from officials in the 
Afghan government to decide cases in favor of 
well-connected parties.26 The assistance must be 
structured to forestall such interference and create 
a protected zone, perhaps both physically and 
politically, within which these institutions can operate. 
For example, the intervention community may 
consider bringing in international experts on 
the model that was used in Kosovo: following 
the conflict there, the United Nations inserted 
international judges and prosecutors to work 
with the local judiciary to administer the justice 
system.27 It also could facilitate centralized judges 
travelling to provinces to hear cases, as has been 
done in Iraq.28 Though such initiatives would not be 
without controversy, efforts must be made to stress 
to the local population the need to grow local 
institutions to the point of independence. 
Moreover, another imperative lies in protecting 
and sufficiently funding judicial bodies to reduce 
their susceptibility to bribery and safeguard 
them from threats. Such threats are common 
where powerful, violent organizations are active. 
In Colombia, for example, roughly 700 judges 
received threats in a four-year period.29 A UK-
U.S. effort to facilitate a special drug court in 
Afghanistan, where judicial officials are protected 
and operate in a secure courthouse, provides one 
model for establishing a stronger judiciary.30 
Corruption Deconstruction
Of course, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the invasions 
now are long past and the window of opportunity 
for impacting the early trajectory of the political 
economy has closed. Nonetheless, it is never too 
late to work to roll back negative trends.31
In order to deconstruct widespread criminal 
enterprises after the transition gap has closed, 
high-level intervening actors must be willing to 
use leverage to force host country officials to crack 
25. See Terrence K. Kelly et al., A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justifications and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.pdf.
26. Ben Arnoldy, “Tearful Karzai warns of youth exodus from Afghanistan. Here’s why,” Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 2010, http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0929/Tearful-Karzai-warns-of-youth-exodus-from-Afghanistan.-Here-s-why.
27. Tom Perriello and Marieka Wierda, “Lessons from the Deployment of International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo,” International Center for 
Transitional Justice (March 2006), 13.
28. U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: June 2009 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department 
of Defense Supplemental Appropriates Act of 2008,” June 2009, 9, accessed March 14, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/9010_Report_to_
CongressJul09.pdf.
29. “Reportan 700 jueces amenazados en cuatro anos,” Caracol Radio, June 29, 2010, accessed March 14, 2011, http://www.caracol.com.co/nota.
aspx?id=1319841.
30. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan’s Narco War: Breaking the Link Between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents, 111th Congress, 
1st sess., 2009, Committee Print, 11, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/USGOV_AfghanistansNarcoWar_BreakingLink_
DrugTraffickersInsurgents.pdf.
31. I have suggested in Military Review a range of options for dealing with well-entrenched corruption. That advice, intended largely for military 
commanders in the field, recommended that they focus on reducing opportunities for corruption, increasing the risks of illicit activities, and 
minimizing the potential rewards for such behavior. That article, however, did not address in great detail the higher-level political capital that must 
be expended to truly weed out endemic corruption. See Dahl, “The Quiet Enemy.”
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down on corruption, and potentially lay out a plan 
to attack such corruption themselves. The fact that 
such corruption is so well entrenched likely means 
that political instability will result from aggressive 
efforts to purify the ranks of government and 
harmful power brokers. Yet, as mentioned previously, 
much of this instability can be avoided if attempts 
are made to provide access to resources through 
formal, impartial institutions. By first eroding the 
support base of the power brokers, it then is 
possible to remove them from positions of power.
In some instances, such resource redirection 
may take too long. The policymaker, therefore, is 
faced with a tradeoff between potential instability 
at a time when foreign support is still present and 
restabilization is possible, and the facade of stability 
in the present followed by potential collapse once 
foreign support diminishes. The decision, therefore, 
comes down essentially to the investment that 
policymakers are willing to make in reestablishing 
normal institutional processes. Where stabilizing 
forces insist on planning and resourcing only one 
year in advance, it will be difficult to develop and 
sufficiently resource the type of strategy necessary 
to deconstruct illicit power structures. Likewise, if 
stabilizing forces plan on a near-term withdrawal, 
the prospects for achieving durable change—and 
creating institutions strong enough to sustain their 
own power—are low. To put it in crude terms, 
with the prospect of near-term withdrawal from a 
compromised host state, the sustainability of the 
status quo is largely dependent upon endogenous 
resourcing factors and local political realities. If the 
host government has difficulty producing sufficient 
revenue to function and is factionalized, collapse is 
highly likely.
Some nations, such as Iraq, have sufficient 
rent-producing income to prop up a modicum of 
institutions. If the relevant political parties are able 
to come to adequate power- and resource-sharing 
arrangements, the country may survive withdrawal. 
Yet in countries such as Afghanistan, there is quite 
simply not enough revenue to provide basic state 
services and still permit kleptocrats to take their 
share. In such states, conflict over the limited spoils 
likely will follow withdrawal. Moreover, due to 
inadequate resourcing and crippling infighting, 
the power players propped up by intervening 
forces likely will be too weak to resist the type 
of organized threat—such as that posed by the 
Taliban—that can then use the territory as a base 
to protect foreign terrorists or directly pose greater 
threats to its neighbors and the world. This was 
the case when the Russians left Afghanistan in the 
1980s and the Taliban took power in the 1990s. It 
continues to be the case in Afghanistan today.
Moreover, in assessing efforts to attack 
corruption, it is critical that success is measured by 
outcomes rather than mere inputs. The USAID Rule 
of Law program in Afghanistan is a case in point. 
A USAID website boasts that the organization 
trained more than 50 percent of the Afghan 
judiciary.32 A survey released in the summer of 
2010 in Afghanistan, however, indicates that 50 
percent of Afghans perceive the courts and the 
Ministry of Justice as the most corrupt institutions 
in the country.33 It is not sufficient to train judicial 
members if, for a variety of reasons, they are 
not justly applying the country’s laws. Therefore, 
different measures must be developed to more 
accurately gauge results. 
In short, the only way to truly root out 
corruption, once deeply established, may be to 
pursue a medium-term strategy that involves 
substantial resource investment, aggressive 
leveraging with the local elites, and coherent and 
properly focused attempts to stand up essential 
institutions. 
The argument for early stage law enforcement 
efforts, thus far, has been largely strategic and 
moral in nature. Immediate action in critical rule 
of law investigation and enforcement capacity 
is essential to sound counterinsurgency strategy 
and responsible transitional leadership. Yet these 
considerations only imply that such activities are 
sound policy, not that binding obligations exist 
to execute them. There increasingly are reasons 
32. Accessed October 16, 2010, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/afghanistan/index.html.
33. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010,” 74, accessed October 16, 2010,  
http://www.iwaweb.org/corruptionsurvey2010/Main_findings_files/IWA%20National%20Corruption%20Survey%202010.pdf.
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to believe, however, that such actions also are 
necessary under international law, thereby creating 
binding obligations for parties to whom the law 
applies. 
Part II. 
Legal Aspects of the Debate
Potential Sources of Law 
Governing Military Activities
There are a host of potential sources of applicable 
legal norms in occupation situations. These 
sources include debellatio, UN Security Council 
Resolutions, international humanitarian law (IHL, 
or more specifically the Law of Occupation), and 
international human rights law (HRL), all of which 
will be reviewed herein. The focus of this section 
will be on occupation situations, a unique legal 
category in which specific treaties, particularly 
IHL, govern the conduct of occupying forces 
(stabilizing forces). Thus, while the strategic and 
moral necessity of closing the transition gap would 
be necessary in any situation, the legal necessity 
according to the argument that follows only arises 
in relevant occupation situations.
This section will conclude that the infrequency 
of fully recognized occupations (though they may 
exist practically, the occupants do not acknowledge 
them as such) has hampered the development of 
a clear set of laws guiding occupation, leaving a 
maze of norms from which occupiers can draw 
to guide their actions. However, it also will lay the 
groundwork for the argument that IHL and HRL 
are entirely consistent and interdependent when it 
comes to fighting corruption and crime, and that 
they must be read together to impose an obligation 
on occupying powers to combat illicit behavior. 
Finally, even where IHL may not technically be 
applicable, the types of activities it arguably requires 
should provide guideposts for any stabilizing forces.
We turn now to the potential sources of 
governing law that dictate the proper actions for 
stabilizing forces.
Debellatio
The oldest source of law potentially impacting 
occupation situations is called debellatio. This 
concept, the legal analogue to absolute war, 
essentially sees the defeated government as totally 
annihilated and allows for an occupying authority 
to make sweeping changes to host institutions.34 
Melissa Patterson, writing in the Harvard 
International Law Journal, argued that debellatio 
consists of a tripartite framework: (1) the invaded 
state ceases to exist by virtue of the disintegration 
of its national institutions; (2) the occupying victor 
acquires title to the territory formerly controlled by 
the toppled state; and, (3) the new titleholder has 
plenary powers over the territory where the state 
previously existed.35 
While some commentators have argued that a 
modernized version of such a concept would be 
most applicable to the situation in Iraq,36 it also 
is arguable that modern concepts of statehood 
and international relations make debellatio 
obsolete. Modern notions of sovereignty and 
self-determination37 would directly conflict with 
a concept that essentially provides carte blanche 
authority to an occupying power. Moreover, the 
customary notion in international law that the 
state continues to exist despite government failure 
seems to directly rebut the aged concept of total 
annihilation. Because debellatio holds little sway 
today, we next examine occupation situations under 
34. Brett H. McGurk, “A Lawyer in Baghdad,” Green Bag 8, no. 2 (2004): 51, FN1. Though debellatio would not even countenance the terms of 
occupier, occupation, and the like, they are used here to maintain consistency in describing the presence of foreign forces in a given territory not 
under the authority of those forces’ sovereign at the onset of military operations.
35. Melissa Patterson, Who’s Got the Title? or, The Remnants of Debellatio in Post-Invasion Iraq, Harvard International Law Journal 47 (2006): 467, 
481−82, 480−81.
36. Ibid., 468.
37. Benvenisti discusses, in detail, the applicability of such notions to modern occupations. See Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of 
Occupation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3−31,.
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Security Council Authority, IHL (embodied, for our 
purposes, in the Hague Regulations of 1907 and 
the Geneva Convention of 1949), and HRL.38
UNSC Resolutions
To examine the significance of United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), we look 
at their applicability in the occupation of Iraq. 
In Iraq, the CPA was compelled to act under 
UNSCRs 1483 and 1511.39 UNSCR 1483 called 
upon the CPA “to promote the welfare of the 
Iraqi people through the effective administration 
of the territory, including in particular working 
towards the restoration of conditions of security 
and stability and the creation of conditions in which 
the Iraqi people can freely determine their own 
political future.”40 The CPA argued that through 
the UNSCRs the United Nations commanded the 
CPA to play an “active and vigorous role in the 
administration and reconstruction of Iraqi society.”41
Resolution 1511 emphasized “the importance 
of establishing effective Iraqi police and security 
forces in maintaining law, order, and security,”42 
Paragraph 13 of the same “… authorizes a 
multinational force under unified command to 
take all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq …”43
It seems, then, that whatever else the UNSCRs 
may have implied, there clearly was an emphasis 
placed on restoring policing and providing 
security as an imperative function of the CPA. 
Yet UNSCRs provide little detail about what such 
obligations actually may entail. Moreover, they 
may not be promulgated in every situation in 
which occupations occur, and even where they are, 
applicable IHL and HRL still apply.
Law of Occupation (IHL)
This paper assumes a traditional understanding of 
the Law of Occupation, a subset of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is primarily based 
upon the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land.44 Much modern scholarship has 
conflated separate bodies of human rights law, 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), under the heading of 
IHL.45 Unlike the Law of Occupation, however, 
international human rights norms were not 
expressly written with conflict situations in mind. 
They will, therefore, be dealt with separately in a 
subsequent section. The consanguinity of these 
two bodies of law as they pertain to military 
occupations, however, will be established later  
in this paper.
i. Hague Article 43
The fulcrum of IHL is Article 43 of the 1907 Hague 
Convention, which reads,
“The authority of the legitimate power 
having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures 
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far 
as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the 
laws in force in the county.”46
38. McGurk openly acknowledges the coalition as occupiers in Iraq, and the consequent applicability of occupation law. McGurk, 51−55.
39. UN Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1483, S/RES/1483, May 22, 2003,  http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/
N0336853.pdf?OpenElement; UN Security Council, Resolution 1511, US/RES/1511, October 16, 2003, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N03/563/91/PDF/N0356391.pdf?OpenElement. 
40. UNSC, Resolution1483, par. 4, Ch. 7 provisions.
41. McGurk, 53−54.
42. UNSC, Resolution 1511, par. 16.
43. Ibid. (original emphasis)
44. International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, article 43, October 18 1907, 2 U.S.T. 2269 [hereinafter Hague IV].
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], Article 2, par. 1, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
46. Hague IV, Article 43.
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It is necessary to mention from the outset that 
the English translation of the original, authoritative 
French regulation has been criticized and corrected 
in scholarship.47 The French “l’ordre et la vie 
publics,” was translated into English as “public 
order and safety,” though “public order and civil 
life” seems a more accurate translation.48 The 
concept of civil life, according to the legislative 
history of the document, can be described as 
“social functions, ordinary transactions which 
constitute daily life.”49 Thus, the international 
mandate would encompass wider obligations than 
basic military security operations alone.
One of the most authoritative experts on 
occupation law, Yoram Dinstein, read Hague 
Article 43 to create “two distinct obligations”: 
“(i) to restore and ensure as far as possible, public 
order and life in the occupied territory; and, (ii) to 
respect the laws in force in the occupied territory 
unless an absolute impediment exists.”50 Another 
commentator refers to the latter obligation to 
respect the laws in force in the occupied territory 
as the “conservationist principle.”51 According to 
this principle, the occupier enjoys no sweeping 
authority to make permanent changes to “legal 
and political structures” in the territory. One 
former CPA attorney acknowledges that Article 
43 constitutes a general prohibition against 
“transformative” change.52 More importantly, 
another scholar extends the conservationist 
claim even further by arguing that there is no 
obligation to create institutions that monitor rights 
compliance, investigate allegations of wrongdoing, 
and prosecute violators.53 The analysis below will 
directly refute this latter contention as inconsistent 
with a holistic reading of IHL and HRL. 
An alternative interpretation of IHL holds that 
Article 43 creates an affirmative obligation to 
“protect the civil population from a meaningful 
decline in orderly life.”54 In this broader view, the 
distinction between “life” and “safety” is essential, 
because an occupying power may frequently “… 
show callous indifference to any hardships (unrelated 
to safety and security) that befall [the population].”55 
Arguably, moreover, this is an obligation of 
means and not results.56 According to some analysts, 
the affirmative obligations imposed by Article 43 
may not be as intensive as those that would be 
required to fulfill human rights obligations.57 Again, 
however, a modernized reading of both IHL and HRL 
make such a distinction between the two bodies 
difficult to defend.58 Even within the narrower, 
exclusivist readings of the different bodies of law, 
however, one thing is clear: criminal prosecution 
constitutes “[t]he most traditional way of restoring 
public order,”59 and such activity thus would 
arguably be required by Article 43.
Eyal Benvenisti, however, sees a much more 
limited relevance for Article 43 in modern 
occupation law.60 He feels that the phrase is 
47. See, for example, Marco Sassoli, “Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers,” European Journal of 
International Law (2005): 663−64 Benvenisti, 7; and Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 90.
48. Sassoli, 663−64; Benvenisti, 7; Dinstein, 90.
49. Sassoli, 663−64.
50. Dinstein, 90.
51. Gregory H. Fox, “The Occupation of Iraq,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 36 (2005): 199.
52. McGurk, 52.
53. Fox, 271.
54. Dinstein, 90.
55. Ibid.
56. Sassoli, 664−65.
57. Ibid.
58. See Analysis section below.
59. Sassoli, 664−65.
60. Benvenisti, 30−31.
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vulnerable to changing conceptions regarding the 
proper role of a government, and notes that when 
the Hague Regulations were written, laissez-faire 
governance was the dominant ideal of the day.61 
Yet, while Benvenisti is probably right in saying 
Article 43 has “at best become an incomplete 
instruction to the occupant,”62 even laissez-
faire governments would have acknowledged 
law enforcement functions such as policing 
and prosecution to be ineluctable elements 
of governance. Moreover, despite Benvenisti’s 
incredulity as to the efficacy of the regulation, 
traditional IHL was invoked by the UN Security 
Council when it asked occupying powers to observe 
their obligations under IHL with respect to Iraq.63 
Ultimately, the precise applicability of Article 
43 is left open for debate, a dangerous precedent 
when people’s lives and well-being are on the line. 
As will be discussed below, HRL provides added 
flesh to the skeletal structure the IHL conventions 
established, and which narrow readers of Article 43 
overlook.64 
Human Rights Law (HRL)
Questions about the potential applicability of HRL65 
to occupation settings have given rise to much 
academic speculation.66 There is a growing trend, 
not without its critics, to incorporate human rights 
laws into the obligations assumed to inhere in 
occupying authorities.67 
i. Applicability of Human Rights  
Law during Occupation
John Cerone cites the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) “Advisory Opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” the 
agreement of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC) to the effect that the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), one of the leading human rights accords, is 
applicable in times of war.68 
Some disagree. Arguing for the predominance 
of the conservationist principle, Gregory Fox 
points out that the principle would cease to exist 
where applicable human rights law imposed 
obligations to legislate outside of “conservationist” 
boundaries.69 Yet this claim does not prove that 
the basic security functions of effective governance 
must be ignored. Indeed, the potential applicability 
of human rights laws arguably would create an 
affirmative obligation for the occupying authority 
to take certain measures to “ensure” the rights of 
the population in ways that would not necessarily 
break the conservationist principle regarding local 
legislation.
ii. Affirmative Obligation  
through Human Rights
The Velasquez-Rodriguez case, a watershed in 
modern human rights law, provides a window on 
the connectivity of IHL and HRL.70 In Velasquez, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights read the 
term “ensure” in the preambular paragraph of the 
American Convention on Human Rights to create 
affirmative obligations on the state to “organize 
the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the 
61. Ibid., 9, 209−10.
62. Ibid., 30.
63. See UN Security Council, Resolution 1483, par. 5.
64. See Analysis section below.
65. HRL as referred to here includes a range of various treaties and covenants signed by states in mutual recognition of the rights of humanity.
66. See, for example, John Cerone, “Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law During Armed Conflict, 
Occupation, and Peace Operations,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2006): 1447; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to 
Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, California Law Review 78 (1990): 451.
67. Cerone, 1453−54.
68. Ibid.
69. Fox, 274−75.
70. Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (ser. C), no. 4 (July 29, 1988), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec_04_ing.pdf.
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71. Velasquez, par. 166.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., par. 172.
74. Ibid., par. 174.
75. Thomas Buergenthal, “To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations,” in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, ed. Louis Henkin, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 77.
76. Atachahua v. Peru, CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) (April 16, 1996).
77. UNHRC, General Comment no. 6, April 30, 1982.
78. UNHRC, General Comment no. 20, March 10, 1992.
79. UNHRC, General Comment no. 16, April 8, 1988.
80. Silih v. Slovenia, application no. 71463/01, European Court of Human Rights (April 9, 2009).
81. Cerone, 1466.
82. Buergenthal, 77.
83. Cerone, 1467.
84. Dinah Shelton, “Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibilities of States,” 13 Fordham International Law Journal 13 no. 1 (1989): 
22−23.
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structures through which public power is exercised, 
so that [state parties] are capable of juridically 
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human 
rights.”71 Moreover, according to the Inter-American 
Court, the state must “prevent, investigate and 
punish [emphasis added] any violation of the rights 
recognized by the Convention.”72 Additionally, 
even a private act could lead to state responsibility 
if there was a “… lack of due diligence to prevent 
the violation or to respond to it as required by 
the Convention.”73 Finally, the state’s duty is, 
specifically, “… to take reasonable steps to prevent 
human rights violations …”74 
The same obligation, to “take whatever measures 
are necessary [emphasis added] to enable individuals 
to enjoy or exercise the rights guaranteed by the 
Covenant” also arguably exists in the ICCPR, which 
is valid in Iraq, Afghanistan, and some 165 other 
countries.75 The presence of such obligations in 
the ICCPR is evident through both the decisions 
and general comments of the UN Human Rights 
Committee (UNHRC), the body responsible for 
adjudicating rights claims under the ICCPR. In 
Atachahua v. Peru, for example, the UNHRC held 
that Peru had violated multiple provisions of the 
ICCPR by failing to prevent and punish rights 
violations including arbitrary detention and murder 
by state agents.76 In General Comment No. 6, 
moreover, the UNHRC noted that “State parties 
should take measures not only to prevent and 
punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also 
to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security 
forces.”77 The UNHRC also has commanded that the 
state must take all legislative and “other measures” 
necessary to protect citizens from cruel treatment 
and punishment, whether such punishment occurred 
at the hands of government or private actors.78 It 
has made similar findings in other areas as well.79 
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights 
also has recognized such affirmative obligations 
of the state. Most recently, in Silih v. Slovenia, the 
European Court made clear that it is insufficient 
for states merely to have laws protecting human 
rights on the books; they must enforce those laws 
in practice.80 
These decisions demonstrate an emerging 
norm that imposes upon states some measure of 
responsibility for both public and private actions 
in their territories.81 According to Justice Thomas 
Buergenthal, formerly a judge on the ICJ, the 
obligations tied to the usage of “ensure” includes an 
obligation to “improve the administration of criminal 
justice.”82 Administration would seem to be a broad 
enough term to include legislation and enforcement, 
and Cerone argues that the due diligence 
requirement involves a legislative prohibition of 
violative behavior as well as enforcement.83 Dinah 
Shelton adds that due diligence requires “reasonable 
measures of prevention that a well-administered 
government could be expected to exercise under 
similar circumstances.”84
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iii. Extraterritorial Application of  
Human Rights Conventions
As these human rights conventions purport to 
affect state’s behavior within their own territory, 
an added wrinkle to the applicability question 
involves whether they create obligations in an 
extraterritorial setting such as would exist during 
occupation. As is the case with respect to many 
other legal issues affecting occupations, opinions 
differ.
The United States Supreme Court, in Sale 
v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., found that 
“… a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated 
extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it 
through no more than general humanitarian intent  
…”85 The growing international norm may be in 
conflict with the Court’s rendering, however. 
Cerone points out that the UNHRC frequently 
has held that the ICCPR can have extraterritorial 
application.86 The European Commission on Human 
Rights also has acknowledged the extraterritorial 
obligations of the state.87
Moreover, Justice Buergenthal has written, prior 
to his ICJ judgeship, that the state is obligated to 
ensure the rights of all those within its jurisdiction.88 
The question of jurisdiction seems to rest on factual 
arguments about whether the occupying authority 
exercises powers of government on the ground, 
regardless of whether those powers are exercised 
outside its official territory.89 On this point, it is 
important to remember that the Hague Convention 
acknowledges the adoption of authority by 
occupying powers in Article 43, which reads, 
“The authority of the legitimate power having in 
fact passed into the hands of the occupant …”90 
Finally, the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) has made clear that 
the “rights enshrined in the Covenant belong 
to the people living in the territory of the State 
party”.91 If, indeed, rights rest with the people, 
their rights should be protected regardless of the 
identity of the governing authority. Under such an 
interpretation, the extraterritoriality debate is a red 
herring, because the citizens of a state arguably 
can enforce against an occupying force any treaties 
that are in place against the former government.
The foregoing section highlights the 
uncertainties surrounding the potential legal 
authorities that govern occupation, and the 
proper meaning and scope of those authorities 
even where they are found applicable. In an age 
when many occupiers refuse to be so named, or 
subjected to the laws of occupation, there has 
been limited opportunity to further develop and 
understand occupation law.92 Within already 
existing law and scholarship in the human rights 
field, however, there is a clear tendency toward 
imposing affirmative obligations on governing 
authorities to investigate and prosecute rights 
violations. Consequently, here is a strong argument 
for applying the same obligations to occupying 
authorities. 
Legal Confusion
Brett McGurk, a former CPA attorney, noted 
in looking back on the CPA’s activities that the 
multitude of legal authorities to which they were 
potentially subject created “internal inconsistencies 
that were often hard to reconcile.”93 By his reading, 
it could be impossible in certain circumstances to 
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85. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993). See Theodor Meron, “Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties,” American 
Journal of International Law 89 (1995): 78, 81-82.
86. Cerone, 1471−72.
87. Cyprus v. Turkey, application no. 25781/94, European Court of Human Rights (1994); Buergenthal, 76.
88. Buergenthal, 74.
89. Fox, 273.
90. Hague IV, Article 43.
91. UNHRC, General Comment no. 26, December 8, 1997.
92. Fox, 231.
93. McGurk, 51.
94. Ibid., 55.
95. Ibid., 52−53.
96. The ICCPR is chosen because its provisions provide focal points that are the most relevant to the types of violations seen in conflict 
economies. Other treaties, however, also describe rights which stabilizing forces may be obligated to protect.
97. Hague IV, Article 43, “The authority of the legitimate power having passed into the hands of the occupant …”
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simultaneously comply with both UNSC Resolutions 
and IHL.94 The coalition, he admits, voluntarily 
declared itself an occupying power but IHL 
seemed difficult to apply in situations of long-
term occupation where the UNSC contemplated 
sweeping changes to various institutions.95 
Nonetheless, the legal ambiguity surrounding 
the degree of legislation an occupier can or must 
promote, identified by McGurk and debated by 
academics, is no barrier to a resolution of the more 
limited question about the occupier’s obligations 
and capabilities with respect to the administration 
of law enforcement. As the next section will show, 
a proper, comprehensive reading of various legal 
authorities indicates that the occupying power has 
a duty to effectively police the territory for which 
it is responsible. Consequently, though traditional 
occupation law is ill developed, related law and 
precedent arguably indicate that stabilizing forces 
assume governing authority and the human rights 
obligations that such authority contains. We now 
turn to exploring this claim in greater detail.
Refined Analysis of 
Occupation Obligations
Both IHL and HRL require that a governing 
authority “ensure” basic norms of order. Read 
together, the agreements within the international 
community to ensure basic levels of order (whether 
found in the Hague Convention, the ICCPR, or 
elsewhere) imply an affirmative obligation that a 
governing authority must provide at least a baseline 
social stability function. Because of the coterminous 
elements of both IHL and HRL, it is clear that these 
affirmative obligations exist regardless of whether 
a state is in conflict or at peace. The analysis 
below demonstrates this simultaneous identity of 
obligations imposed by IHL and HRL. In so doing, 
it maintains that a reading of the law that denies 
an occupier’s obligations to attack illicit behavior 
rejects the importance of the most fundamental 
needs of human life and society, and the most 
rudimentary functions that a state must serve in 
ensuring those needs are met. 
The analysis below addresses areas where 
corruption and organized criminality violate 
the basic rights that international law has 
acknowledged governing authorities must protect. 
It discusses areas where international precedents 
clearly have ordained that a governing authority 
is obliged to act to ensure and respect the rights 
of its citizens, and argues that international law 
must be understood to create obligations during 
occupations that force governing authorities to 
attack corruption and organized criminal activities 
that violate the rights enshrined in the ICCPR and 
materially similar conventions.96
The article concludes by asserting that stabilizing 
forces are not immune from affirmative obligations. 
Just like governments functioning in normal 
times, stabilizing forces have an obligation under 
international law to respect and ensure the rights 
of those in the territory they occupy. Such an 
obligation requires that they prevent, investigate, 
and punish violations caused by corruption and 
organized criminality. Thus, policymakers who 
choose to initiate occupation activities must be 
prepared to properly resource and equip their 
armed forces to carry them out.
To Respect and Ensure
It is difficult to imagine any other interpretation of 
the term “ensure” than one which imposes upon 
the subject an obligation to do something to achieve 
the object of the sentence in which “ensure” is 
found. Whatever the goal of the action may be, 
if that object is to be ensured, the subject must in 
some way affirmatively see to it that the object is 
achieved. Both IHL and HRL use the term “ensure” 
with respect to defined subjects and objects. The 
subject of IHL is an occupying power;97 of HRL, a 
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state government.98 The object of each is textually 
different, but both should be read as imposing the 
same affirmative obligations on occupying powers 
and state governments.
As mentioned above, IHL requires that an 
occupant “… restore, and ensure, as far as possible, 
public order and [civil life] …”99 Though HRL varies 
by covenant, the ICCPR demands that a state party 
“undertake[s] to respect and ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present covenant …”100 
Because so few opportunities to further explicate 
occupation law have occurred,101 the concept of 
public order and safety (or civil life, depending on 
the preferred translation) has not been fleshed 
out in the legal arena. The development of HRL 
constitutes the acknowledgment by a similarly 
broad group of states of the basic rights that any 
social order must enshrine, and indirectly then 
gives color to the concept of public order and civil 
life. The case law addressing key provisions of HRL, 
therefore, arguably provide guidance on what the 
Article 43 concept of ensuring public order and civil 
life includes.
Even using the more limited translation of 
public order and safety, Article 43 must be read 
to incorporate the most fundamental rights to 
life, privacy, property, and personal integrity that 
illicit behavior violates. What is order and safety if 
not a citizen’s basic right to live, to have his or her 
privacy protected, and to maintain his or her own 
possessions and bodily integrity? These aspects 
of life are so fundamental to the well-being of 
the human person that, without them, a person 
could not fully participate in society, and society 
itself would cease to function. Without them there 
would, in fact, be no order or safety. The very 
objectives IHL seeks to achieve, therefore, would be 
undermined.  Indeed, the societies would resemble 
pre-surge Iraq and today’s Afghanistan. 
Consequently, affirmative obligations of the 
governing authority derive directly from the 
“ensure” language of the conventions. In both 
IHL and HRL, the subject must ensure the objects 
of the law—which at least include life, privacy, 
property, and bodily integrity.
Scholars on occupation law also recognize this 
overlap. Fox has noted that “substantive rights and 
implementing responsibilities” should “inform our 
understanding” of IHL.102 McCarthy has argued for 
an even broader reading, and claimed that it is not 
permissible for the occupying power to allow for 
“… economic, social, political, and infrastructural 
retardation.”103 Dinstein has argued that a key 
litmus test for judging the propriety of occupation 
actions should be asking whether the occupying 
power is protecting rights in a similar fashion as it 
would in its own state.104
An additional argument for these obligations 
exists, however, in the notion of adoption of the 
legitimate authority’s powers by the occupying 
power. If, as HRL establishes, legitimate authorities 
have the obligation to respect and ensure life, 
property, privacy, and bodily integrity, then 
any view of occupation that contemplates an 
occupier adopting the full responsibilities of the 
legitimate authority also would necessitate the 
adoption of responsibilities to respect and ensure 
the adumbrated rights. Indeed, IHL takes such an 
“adoptive” view of occupation in Article 43. 
Article 43 of the Hague Convention notes, 
“The authority of the legitimate power having in 
fact passed into the hands of the occupant …,” 
and then obliges the occupant to ensure public 
order and safety.105 Because the Hague Convention 
98. ICCPR, Article 2, par. 1, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes …”
99. Hague IV, Article 43.
100. ICCPR, Article 2, par. 1. See also, American Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter ACHR], Chapter 1, Article 1, par. 1, July 18, 1978, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, “… to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure all persons subject to their jurisdiction 
the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms …”
101. Fox, 231.
102. Fox, 296.
103. McCarthy, 62.
104. Dinstein, 121−22.
105. Hague IV, Article 43.
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is addressed to, and specifically describes, the 
responsibilities and obligations of the occupier, and 
Article 43 itself couples authority with obligations, 
it is inconceivable that the Hague Convention 
would intend for authority to pass to the occupier 
without the responsibilities that authority 
necessitates also passing. 
Given the dearth of recognized occupation 
situations, the fact that the international 
understanding of order and safety has undergone 
more specific, if indirect, articulation over the past 
century through HRL should be no surprise. But 
such latter, more specific articulations of state 
obligations should enhance rather than limit our 
understanding of what order and safety can now 
be said to include. Order and safety clearly were 
thought by the world community in the Hague 
Convention to be the most fundamental aspects 
of human society. As evidenced by their universal 
appearance in various human rights covenants, 
life, privacy, property, and bodily integrity also 
are thought by the world community today to 
be equally fundamental to human society. The 
fact that the latter fundamentals were expressed 
through a different legal medium should not 
prohibit us from recognizing their contribution 
to better understanding a governing authority’s 
obligations during occupation.
The UNHRC, the body responsible for overseeing 
the implementation of the ICCPR, agrees. Speaking 
of the obligation to respect and ensure the rights 
listed in the ICCPR, the UNHRC commented, 
“This principle also applies to those within the 
power or effective control of the forces of a State 
Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the 
circumstances in which such power or effective 
control was obtained, such as forces constituting a 
national contingent of a State Party assigned to an 
international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement 
operation.”106 
While the UNHRC’s language may be interpreted 
as limited to UN peacekeeping situations given 
its contemplation of an assignment for such 
responsibilities, the principles of international law 
arguably also would apply to occupants who had 
initiated operations on their own.
A comparison of the fundamental objectives 
underlying IHL and HRL law, thus, makes clear that 
the more specific obligations of the state to ensure 
the rights of its citizens must be read into the 
obligation to maintain order and safety established 
by IHL. The next section will describe in more 
detail, however, the practical actions (prevention, 
investigation, and punishment of violations) such 
obligations require. The final section will drill down 
to an additional level of detail in addressing specific 
types of violations that the occupying authority is 
obliged to prevent, investigate, and punish in order 
to fulfill its obligations under international law. 
Affirmative Obligations:
Prevent, Investigate, and Punish107
The governing authority must fulfill its obligation 
to maintain order and safety by ensuring the 
fulfillment of the traditional functions of the 
state, such as policing, investigations, and the 
prosecution of crimes. In short, it must ensure the 
preservation of the rights universally recognized by 
various human rights treaties as elements of order 
and safety. The overlap of objectives between IHL 
and HRL means that neat distinctions between 
basic policing and separate military occupation no 
longer hold true. One commentator characterized 
the traditional boundaries in this way: “Public order 
is restored through police operations, which are 
governed by domestic law and international human 
rights law, and not through military operations 
governed by IHL on the conduct of hostilities.”108 
This article asserts, however, that military 
occupants must plan for and be prepared to 
execute basic policing and administrative functions 
as part of their occupation. Developments in 
international law mean that the traditional 
distinctions drawn between IHL and HRL no longer 
are viable in stabilization environments. In short, it 
106. UNHRC, General Comment no. 31, par. 10, May 26, 2004.
107. Recognizing that international forces never acknowledged occupation law to exist in Afghanistan (though the point of whether it should have 
is highly debatable), this section uses Afghanistan and Iraq as paradigmatic examples of the types of post-conflict environments where these new 
legal principles could be effectively applied were an occupation approach taken to similar conflicts in the future.
108. Sassoli, 665.
109. Velasquez, par. 166.
110. Paniagua-Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C), no. 37, par. 173 (March 8, 1998).
111. ICCPR, Article 2, par. 3(a).
112. UNHRC, General Comment no. 31, par. 15, May 26, 2004.
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is not enough to plan the war; a stabilization force 
also must plan the peace.
The obligations articulated in Velasquez 
most succinctly describe the policing obligations 
for which a stabilization force must plan: any 
administrative functions that are required to 
prevent, investigate, and punish violations of the 
rights recognized by [relevant conventions].109 The 
key theme of Velasquez, and its progeny in the 
Inter-American, European, and UN human rights 
systems, is that governing authorities must take 
the measures necessary to end the impunity of 
criminals, whether such criminals act in an official 
or private capacity.110 It is precisely the impunity 
of corrupt and organized criminals which leads 
to wholesale violations of the rights of local 
inhabitants, undermines stability operations insofar 
as it compromises trust in governing authorities, 
and minimizes the chances for the establishment 
of strong governing institutions and sustainable 
peace. Therefore, through the protection, 
investigation, and punishment of rights violations, 
stabilizing forces not only fulfill their international 
legal obligations, but also execute more effective 
counterinsurgency and stabilization programs.
Effective Measures to
Preserve Life, Privacy, Property, 
and Personal Integrity
A failure to fulfill the tripartite obligation to 
prevent, investigate, and punish obliges the 
governing authority to provide effective remedies 
to those whose rights have been violated. As 
is clear from the data in Table 4, effective law 
enforcement is amongst the most visible ways 
of government demonstrating its legitimacy to 
households. The investigation and punishment 
of wrongs provides the most tangible remedy. 
Yet such governmental functions also perform a 
preventive purpose insofar as they deter future 
wrongdoing—specifically attacking the impunity 
that reigns in the absence of any such deterrence. 
The right to an effective remedy is a 
fundamental aspect of HRL. Article 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms establishes this right for 
European residents, for example. Moreover, Article 
2 of the ICCPR makes it necessary “to ensure that 
any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective 
remedy.”111 The OHCHR, in addition, has reinforced 
the Velasquez obligations (prevent, investigate, 
punish) by making clear that “administrative 
requirements are particularly required to give effect 
to the general obligations to investigate allegations 
of violations …”112
It is crucial, then, to have effective means of 
preventing, investigating, and prosecuting rights 
violations. It is insufficient to simply have laws 
Table 4: Integrity Watch Afghanistan: 
National Corruption Survey 2010 
In which state services has the existence of corruption 
had a negative impact on your household?
Security by Police 58
Justice by Courts 33
Electricity 14
Payment of Duties/Taxes 12
Hospitals/Health Services 11
Primary/Secondary 10
Higher Education 8
Land/Property Registry, Sale, Purchase 6
Transport Services/Licensing 5
Employment/Disability 5
ID Cards/Passports 3
NSP 2
Hajj Services 2
Other 14
Source: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “Afghan 
Perceptions and Experience of Corruption: A National 
Survey 2010” available at: http://www.iwaweb.org/
corruptionsurvey2010/Main_findings_files/IWA%20
National%20Corruption%20Survey%202010.pdf
113. Silih v. Slovenia, application no. 71463/01, European Court of Human Rights (April 9, 2009), par. 195 (noting that “State’s obligation … will not be 
satisfied if the protection afforded by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice …”).
114. See generally Silih. 
115. Silih, par. 10−85.
116. Ibid., par. 192, 195.
117. Ibid., par. 211.
118. Opuz v. Turkey, application no. 33401/02 , European Court of Human Rights, par. 128 (June 9, 2009).
119. Silih, par. 10−85.
120. ICCPR, Article 17.
121. ACHR, Article 11, par. 2.
122. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter CHRFF], Article 8, par. 1, November 4, 1950, 
E.T.S. no. 5, 214 U.N.T.S. 221.
21
C l o s i n g  t h e  T r a n s i t i o n  G a p :  T h e  R u l e  o f  L a w  
I m p e r a t i v e  i n  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  E n v i r o n m e n t s
E f f e c t i v e  M e a s u r e s  t o  P r e s e r v e  L i f e ,  P r i v a c y , 
P r o p e r t y ,  a n d  P e r s o n a l  I n t e g r i t y
or administrative procedures on the books that 
address such measures; the governing authority 
actually must execute the laws in order to satisfy 
their international obligations.113 The following 
four sections address specific instances in which 
corruption and organized criminal activities 
lead to violations of fundamental rights, and 
where occupying authorities must take effective 
measures to prevent, investigate, and prosecute 
such activities. The four key areas (preservation of 
life, privacy, property, and the bodily integrity of 
local inhabitants) are almost universally present in 
various human rights conventions, and therefore 
present sound cornerstones for the development of 
a policing strategy for stabilizing forces.
i. Life 
Article 6 of the ICCPR echoes the universal 
recognition in other human rights documents that 
every human being has a right to life that shall be 
ensured by the state. Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights expresses the same, 
and the obligation under Article 2 was tested in 
Silih v. Slovenia, a case that rose to the Grand 
Chamber in the European Court.114 
Silih involved a family whose son had died 
due to negligent hospital action, but whose 
complaints essentially went unrecognized by 
the local authorities.115 The ECHR found that the 
state has an obligation to provide an effective, 
independent judicial system to adjudicate matters 
such as wrongful death, and that the state has an 
obligation to promptly and effectively respond to 
complaints about wrongful deaths.116 Slovenia’s 
failure to provide these resulted in liability to 
the complainants.117 The ECHR discussed similar 
obligations in Opuz v. Turkey, where it made 
clear that the state must back up criminal laws 
with effective law enforcement machinery for the 
“prevention, suppression, and punishment” of 
violations of the criminal law.118 
Occupying authorities, though potentially 
numbed to the violence wrought by the phases of 
conflict directly preceding the termination of formal 
hostilities, have an obligation to similarly prevent, 
investigate, and punish violent crimes that result 
in wrongful deaths during stabilization activities. 
As discussed above, criminal organizations often 
will compete violently for control of various areas 
or commodities. It is just as essential to properly 
investigate and penalize the deaths that result from 
such activities as those that result from insurgent 
or terrorist violence, or even negligence such as 
existed in Silih.119 
ii. Privacy 
The right to privacy also is recognized in various 
international human rights conventions. Article 
17 of the ICCPR protects individuals from being 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with their privacy and family.120 The American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) similarly 
states, “No one may be the object of arbitrary or 
abusive interference with his private life, his family, 
his home.”121 The European nations similarly have 
agreed that “Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”122
One need only consider the appalling situation 
in Afghanistan of “loan brides” to find an 
obvious example of gross violations of this most 
sanctified sphere of family privacy. In some rural 
Afghan provinces, it is not uncommon to hear of 
123. Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “The Opium Brides of Afghanistan,” Newsweek, April 7, 2008,  http://www.newsweek.com/id/129577.
124. The complexities created by eradication efforts, while acknowledged, are beyond the scope of this paper.
125. Ilhan v. Turkey, application no. 22494/93, European Court of Human Rights (2004).
126. Ibid., par. 12−20.
127. Ibid., par. 104−9.
128. Ibid., par. 107−9.
129. Stephanie Irvine, “Powerful ‘grab Afghanistan land,” BBC News, September 6, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6981035.stm.
130. See generally, Refugee Studies Centre, Iraq’s displacement crisis: the search for solutions, Forced Migration Review (June 2007), http://www.
fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/Iraq/full.pdf.
131. Ibid., 20.
132. ICCPR, Article 7.
133. Ibid., Article 9, par. 1.
134. ACHR, Article 7, par. 1.
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farmers who are forced to give their daughters 
as repayment of loans given by local drug 
traffickers whom they are unable to repay with 
cash crop when their poppy harvest is destroyed 
by eradication efforts.123 The economic pressures 
created by such local trafficking syndicates, and in 
many situations permitted or aided by local police 
forces, destroy human dignity and warp local 
family relations. Such inhuman conduct cannot be 
allowed to go unpunished.124
iii. Property 
International courts also have recognized the 
importance of property rights as a fundamental 
condition of the individual in society. While some 
conventions have not specifically mentioned 
rights to property, the bodies interpreting those 
conventions have been willing to defend property 
rights as a function of prohibitions on inhuman and 
degrading treatment. The ECHR’s decision in Ilhan 
v. Turkey exemplifies such a reading.125 
In Ilhan, Turkish security forces stormed the 
complainant’s home, burning it to the ground and 
destroying its contents as well as his vineyards, 
orchards, and oak trees.126 The ECHR found that 
the destruction constituted a violation of Article 
3 of the European convention, which says, “No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”127 The ECHR 
decided that such destruction and subsequent 
anguish caused to the family by the actions of the 
state qualified as inhuman treatment insofar as 
it left the family without shelter and support and 
obliged them to leave their place of residence.128
Moreover, illegally forced evictions, a substantial 
problem in post-conflict settings, are arguably the 
functional equivalent of destruction since they also 
deprive the family of shelter and support, obliging 
them to leave their place of residence. Such 
evictions and destruction have been prominent 
in postwar Iraq and Afghanistan. Powerful forces 
formed land mafias in postwar Afghanistan and 
deprived Afghan citizens of their land, evicting 
the residents and putting the property to use for 
their own purposes.129 Similarly, in Iraq, reporting 
indicates thousands of forced evictions by non-
state actors.130 This reporting specifically calls on 
host country authorities and international forces 
to “shoulder responsibilities placed on them under 
international law” to ensure protection, security, 
and services for the most vulnerable of Iraqis.131 The 
same could be said of all vulnerable citizens in post-
conflict settings.
Moreover, much like the ECHR, the ICCPR 
provides that “no person shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”132 Stabilizing forces, 
therefore, are under an obligation to prevent, 
investigate, and punish actions, such as the 
destruction and deprivation of property, that 
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment of 
host national occupants.
iv. Personal Integrity 
ICCPR’s Article 9 reads, “Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person.”133 The American 
convention echoes that sentiment, ensuring 
that “every person has the right to security and 
personal liberty.”134 The ECHR states substantially 
E f f e c t i v e  M e a s u r e s  t o  P r e s e r v e  L i f e ,  P r i v a c y ,  
P r o p e r t y ,  a n d  P e r s o n a l  I n t e g r i t y
135. ECHR, Article 5, par. 1.
136. See generally Velasquez.
137. Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-III European Court of Human Rights, par. 128−29 (May 25, 1998).
138. Atachahua, par. 8.6.
139. Kurt, par. 128−29.
140. Velasquez, par. 177 (stating, “Where the acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are 
aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international plane.”)
141. See  UNHRC, General Comment no. 16; compare, Cerone, 1466.
142. Peter Beaumont, “Frontline police of new Iraq are waging secret war of vengeance,” Guardian, November 20, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2005/nov/20/iraq.theobserver.
143. Cerone, 209.
144. The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Center for Law and Military Operations, Rule of Law Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide 
for Judge Advocates (Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2008), 79−80.
145. The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, International and Operational Law Department, Operational Law Handbook 
(Charlottesville, VA: International and Operational Law Department, 2009), 41.
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the same as both the ICCPR and the ACHR.135 The 
right enunciated in each of these clauses strikes at 
one of the most sensitive and prevalent crimes seen 
in post-conflict situations: disappearances. 
Disappearances prompted the Velasquez 
watershed, which first articulated the affirmative 
obligations placed upon governments discussed 
in this essay.136 The European Court, in addition, 
agreed in Kurt v. Turkey that the state must 
investigate disappearances, and that not doing 
so constitutes a violation of the right to liberty 
and security of the person.137 The UNHRC has 
agreed, finding in Atachahua v. Peru that the 
violent removal by state agents and subsequent 
failure to investigate the whereabouts of Laureano 
Atachahua constituted a violation of the right to 
liberty and security of the person.138 
While the Kurt and Atachahua decisions both 
focused specifically on a disappearance involving 
state actors, there is no reason why the right 
to liberty and security of the person should be 
limited only to situations where state officials 
were involved.139 Velasquez, poignantly, makes 
clear that a state’s obligation to investigate applies 
regardless of whether the state or a private actor is 
the potential wrongdoer.140 The UN and the ECHR 
agree.141 
Thus, disappearances offer yet another example 
of a crime against human rights that an occupying 
power is obligated to prevent, investigate, and 
punish in accordance with international law. 
Inaction in the early days of occupation ultimately 
shrouds nascent illicit actors in a veil of impunity. 
In Iraq, the widespread disappearances that began 
in 2003 and only escalated after the transition 
provide an unsettling example of such a problem.142 
Numerous examples of such impunity also are 
evident in the everyday life of Afghans.
U.S. Objections
Military officials may argue that this understanding 
of IHL and HRL obligations expands the mission 
beyond reasonable bounds and places too many 
responsibilities on limited forces. Indeed, the 
responsibility lies with policymakers to recognize 
the full weight and obligations created by 
international law (as well as sound strategic and 
moral decision making), and to provide the military 
sufficient resources to perform the functions it 
must perform to adhere to international norms.
The U.S. military also has maintained that it is not 
subject to the obligations imposed by the ICCPR in 
extraterritorial settings.143 It maintains that IHL is lex 
specialis that operates to the exclusion of HRL.144 For 
several reasons, however, that logic hardly seems 
to offer sufficient response to the obligations to 
maintain public order and safety as outlined above. 
Indeed, as the foregoing discussion has made 
clear, Article 43 offers only a vague impression 
of government obligations that HRL can animate 
in greater detail. The U.S. Army’s Operational 
Law Handbook, moreover, recognizes that those 
aspects of human rights law that rise to the level 
of customary international law are considered 
obligatory, but does not outline what qualifies 
as customary international law.145 Moreover, 
24
C l o s i n g  t h e  T r a n s i t i o n  G a p :  T h e  R u l e  o f  L a w  
I m p e r a t i v e  i n  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  E n v i r o n m e n t s
T h e  Q u e s t i o n  o f  R e m e d i e s
the general rejection of obligations in addition 
to IHL during occupation is out of step with 
the statements and decisions of international 
bodies such as the UNHRC and the ICJ, which 
support potential extraterritorial validation.146 In 
addition, respected experts such as Justice Thomas 
Buergenthal have made clear that ICCPR obligations 
apply to any territory within a state’s jurisdiction (or 
authority).147 Finally, it is quite simply untenable to 
maintain that a state should recognize ICCPR rights 
within its own borders, but not within the borders 
of another state where it exercises governing 
authority. To do so would be to relegate the rights 
of other nationalities to an imagined substratum 
that the very raison d’être of an international 
covenant—and the impulse for occupation and 
displacement of rogue governments—denies.
Most importantly, however, because the 
occupying authority inherits the authorities and 
obligations of the legitimate government under 
Article 43, an occupying power such as the United 
States cannot escape its international obligations 
through an extraterritoriality exception argument. 
Through occupation, the occupier is responsible 
to uphold essential rights through the updated 
reading of IHL espoused in this article, but also due 
to its inheritance of the Conventional obligations of 
the previous authorities of the occupied territory. 
In that respect, it is interesting to note that both 
Iraq and Afghanistan have ratified or acceded to 
the ICCPR in 1971 and 1983, respectively.148 As was 
stated previously, 165 other countries—including 
Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Zimbabwe (to name a 
few randomly selected nations)—also are parties to 
the ICCPR.
The Question of Remedies
To be sure, the U.S. position on extraterritorial 
obligations likely is rooted in concerns about 
exposure to legal liability. Where the cases brought 
actually address the failure of a government to 
adequately prevent, investigate, and punish rights 
violations, the relevant conventions make remedies 
available to claimants. The United States and 
other stabilizing forces are, therefore, justifiably 
concerned about the potential liability to which 
they could be exposed through stability operations.
A range of remedies can be awarded to 
claimants. In some cases, authorities are ordered to 
pay damages to those who suffered wrongs that 
were not adequately addressed.149 In other cases, 
authorities are ordered to properly investigate 
the claims.150 Importantly, however, the case law 
discussed above does not place a burden of 
perfection upon governing authorities. Rather, it 
essentially requires good faith efforts by authorities 
to establish adequate law enforcement institutions 
and procedures and ensure their effective 
functioning. Consequently, as argued in the first 
part of this essay, this legal obligation would not 
place any greater burden on stabilizing forces than 
would already exist were they to follow a sound rule 
of law strategy during the transition gap period. 
From a technical legal perspective, it also is 
highly unlikely that any liability could emerge from 
recent activities in Iraq or Afghanistan. While 
they are all signatories to the ICCPR recognizing 
the human rights obligations of signatory states, 
the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan are 
not signatories to the Optional Protocol, which 
actually gives citizens the ability to bring actions 
before the UNHRC. Moreover, if actions were 
brought in the United States, the Supreme Court 
already has made clear in Sale that it does not 
recognize extraterritorial obligations that were 
not contemplated when the government signed a 
particular treaty.151 Thus, while the legal points are 
debatable, the risk of liability arising from these 
current stabilization actions is probably minimal, 
and should not scare officials away from seriously 
entertaining the various legal, strategic, and moral 
facets of the suggestions made in this essay.
Finally, coming to terms with these obligations 
may provide an opportunity to address the 
146. See UNHRC, General Comment no. 6; UNHRC, General Comment no. 20.
147. Buergenthal, 73−74.
148. UN Database, Status of Treaties, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.
149. See the holdings of Velasquez (note 71), Opuz (note 120), Ilhan (note 127), Kurt (note 139), and Silih (note 81) for examples.
150. See the holdings of Atachahua (note 77), Paniagua-Morales (note 112) for examples.
151. Sale, 509 U.S. 155; Cerone, 1471-72.
152. Through the generosity of a 2010 Arthur C. Helton Fellowship from the American Society of International Law , I was able to perform work 
in Kabul further developing this concept. For more information on this project, please see http://www.asil.org/reflection_dahl.cfm; and on the 
Fellowship generally, see http://www.asil.org/helton-fellowship.cfm. The section on proposals for Afghanistan (Beyond Occupation) addresses 
issues that I examined during the Fellowship. 
153. UNSC, Resolution 1483.
154. UNSC, Resolution 1378.
155. UNSC, Resolution 1483, par. 4, Chapter 7 provisions.
156. UNSC, Resolution 1378, par. 4. 
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serious problem of corrupt and uncooperative 
officials in host countries to which stability forces 
provide assistance. Acknowledging international 
legal obligations to prevent, investigate, and 
punish violations could help to compel host 
country officials to perform the basic functions 
that corruption and criminality undermine. 
However, occupation law applies in only a 
narrow set of circumstances, and even where 
it may arguably apply, occupying forces often 
are reluctant to acknowledge its applicability. 
What alternatives exist for fighting corruption 
and organized crime in environments where 
occupation is not acknowledged or sovereignty 
of the host institutions has been fully established 
so that occupying forces no longer have the legal 
authorities that occupation law would grant? The 
next section explores this topic using Afghanistan 
as an example.152 
Part III: Beyond Occupation
As discussed, the United States never has accepted 
the label of occupation force in Afghanistan, nor 
did it send adequate forces early in the conflict to 
execute the broad law enforcement obligations 
discussed above. Moreover, there are plausible 
arguments to be made that the international 
community would be unwilling to accept the 
occupation label, or send in occupying forces, in 
many future interventions. The following section 
discusses situations in which the international 
community has rejected occupation law or 
sovereignty already has been established, first 
addressing the need to adequately authorize 
and resource stabilization efforts even where 
occupation is rejected, and then making specific 
recommendations for using local laws to enable 
citizens to assert their rights where international 
forces are limited because of sovereignty and other 
concerns.
Enabling International Actors
The foregoing sections captured the powerful 
potential that occupation law has to require more 
of stabilizing forces while simultaneously enabling 
more effective stabilization efforts. It shows that 
decision makers must think very carefully about 
the types of interventions they desire and the legal 
authorities that are necessary in executing sound 
strategy and fulfilling our moral obligations to 
host country citizens. Even where interventions fall 
short of activating full-scale occupation law, the 
international community must authorize its forces 
to fully attack organized crime and corruption, and 
must be clearer about the language it uses and the 
types of authorizations it is granting.
The UN Security Council Resolution addressing 
the intervention in Iraq does recognize that the 
stabilizing forces were occupying powers, noting 
the “… obligations under applicable international 
law of these states as occupying powers under 
unified command.”153 By contrast, the resolutions 
addressing the initial stages of the intervention 
in Afghanistan contain no language recognizing 
occupying law.154 Nonetheless, both resolutions 
contain similar-sounding injunctions on supporting 
local institutions, safety, and security. The Iraq 
resolution called for the stabilizing authority to “… 
promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through 
the effective administration of the territory,” as 
well as “… to assist the people of Iraq in their 
efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their 
country.”155 The Afghanistan Resolution recognized 
obligations for UN Member States to provide “… 
support for such [transitional] administration and 
government, including through the implementation 
of quick-impact projects.”156 Additionally, both 
resolutions enjoin member states to take measures 
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ensuring the safety and security of the local 
populations. Despite such language, however, the 
security presence and posture in both countries 
involved little focus on actual law enforcement 
activities.
It is critical for international diplomats and 
intervention strategists to clarify the meaning 
of language espousing such safety and security 
measures, which in practice seems to have little 
import. In an era of failing states and the rise of 
substate actors, when various types of international 
support or interventions may be necessary, 
developing a clearer understanding of intervening 
obligations has become all the more urgent.157 
The credibility of international agreements and 
interventions, in fact, rests upon the significance 
that attaches to the authorizations they create. If 
the UN Security Council commands international 
forces to provide for local safety and security, and 
yet crime and corruption are permitted to overtake 
local institutions, what kind of credibility can such 
authorizations have? 
To be certain, much of the challenge with overly 
explicit authorizations lies in the international 
tendency to recognize local sovereignty and 
avoid any actions that may seem to infringe on 
such sovereignty. It is unclear, for example, what 
the Security Council meant when it recognized 
its “strong commitment to the sovereignty” of 
Afghanistan in the very first resolution of the 
Afghan conflict, when no discernible Afghan 
government existed.158 Similar questions surround 
the council’s reaffirmation of the “sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Iraq” in Resolution 1483, 
which simultaneously recognized the authorities 
and obligations of the occupying powers that had 
just toppled the Hussein regime.159 
The concept of sovereignty, therefore, is a 
dangerously ambiguous term when used in 
conjunction with stabilization authorizations. 
The term often is used as a conceptual argument 
against more robust authorization or resourcing 
of stabilizing forces. Arguably, it does more 
harm to recognize the full sovereignty of a 
state in which the host state institutions are 
incapable of performing many of the functions of 
government. This was precisely the case during 
the transition gap period in places like Iraq and 
Afghanistan, when a reticence to execute robust 
law enforcement functions merely left space for 
criminal organizations and activities to proliferate.
Therefore, international negotiators must be 
clear about the types of authorities that exist, and 
consider the full institutional needs of weakened 
host countries rather than gravitating toward 
ambiguous but restrictive concepts of state 
sovereignty. In short, when authorizing future 
interventions, the UN must make clear that forces 
are responsible and authorized to take measures 
necessary to attack organized crime and criminality.
Yet even where an ambiguously restrictive 
sovereignty has been established and adequate 
legal authorities for stabilizing forces do not exist, 
there still should be ways for using local laws to 
empower host country citizens against illicit actors. 
Afghanistan provides an excellent case study of 
where such opportunities exist even today.
Enabling Local Actors
In Afghanistan, stabilizing forces can use local law 
to empower citizens to file actions for human rights 
violations against government and other powerful 
actors. There are two primary legal systems for 
punishing human rights violations: criminal and 
civil. The working of the criminal system requires 
that the Attorney General or relevant prosecutor 
file criminal charges against the offender, and that 
the judge move forward with the case. Where 
warlords are too powerful, there is much evidence 
to indicate that one or both of these steps do not 
happen. 
Victims of rights abuses, however, also can 
directly file civil claims demanding compensation 
from abusers for the offenses they have committed. 
For both cultural and informational reasons, 
157. One such sphere, beyond the scope of this paper, is the nascent “Responsibility to Protect,” which is a foundation for UN authorizations 
where atrocities or other types of violence must be stopped. Much like occupation law, however, the nuances of what exactly this authorizes are 
far from clear.
158. UNSC, Resolution 1378.
159. UNSC, Resolution 1483.
160. These rough indicators come from informal surveys performed during my Fellowship in Afghanistan with the assistance of the AIHRC.
161. The AIHRC should, however, review any restrictions on the provision of legal aid and ensure that such evidentiary support would not violate 
such restrictions.
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Afghans often are not aware of such options, and 
this opportunity is rarely utilized.
Because the criminal system often fails to 
prosecute, and there is not a culture of civil lawsuits, 
warlords face virtually no legal or financial 
consequences for their negative actions. 
International actors and Afghan civil society can 
impose consequences on warlords for their 
inappropriate actions by supporting civil lawsuits by 
victims of human rights abuses. Several grounds exist 
for filing civil suits against human rights violators.
i. Civil Action Initiatives 
The legal basis for filing civil suits against 
government officials—or possibly those connected 
to the government in some way—exists in Article 
51 of the Afghan constitution. Article 51 reads, 
“Any person suffering undue harm by government 
action is entitled to compensation, which he can 
claim by appealing to court.”
Moreover, even if the violator cannot be linked 
to the government, there is a substantial basis in 
both Afghanistan’s civil code, and in Islamic Sharia 
law—on which most of the Afghan civil code is 
based—for filing civil lawsuits against those who 
have injured citizens in some way. Additionally, 
even where the specific law does not exist, new 
and creative legal arguments about rights violations 
can be made by appealing to ijtihad, an Islamic 
concept similar to analogical reasoning that permits 
judges to reach new conclusions of law based 
on older examples. In short, skilled legal counsel 
can be incredibly effective in helping to create 
consequences for offenders and achieve remedies 
for victims. 
While the Afghan constitution and laws give 
the right to sue the government, there is little 
indication that Afghan citizens are currently 
utilizing this right. There seem to be several reasons 
for inaction. In my prior work in Afghanistan, many 
citizens indicated that they did not trust the system 
or believe doing anything would help. Others 
simply were unaware that they had any legal 
options. Many, however, indicated that they would 
be willing to file a civil suit if they had some form 
of assistance.160 
This willingness demonstrates the value of 
supporting some sort of legal aid for civil suits 
against human rights offenders. International 
actors and Afghan civil society can consider 
providing a forum for bringing together various 
legal aid providers and enabling them to support 
legal actions by victims. Where legal aid resources 
are limited, the international actors may consider 
providing financial support to enable legal aid 
providers to hire attorneys. The international 
community and Afghan civil society also can assist 
legal aid providers in selecting high-profile cases 
for which strong evidence exists. The filing and 
success of such lawsuits can send strong messages 
to the public about their ability to recover for 
damages, and to violators about the costs that will 
be imposed for improprieties. 
Moreover, one of the key challenges for those 
wishing to file civil suits is their inability to compel 
the provision of evidence by government officials 
or other powerful actors. The limited resources 
for discovering and collecting such evidence also 
appears problematic. The international community 
and Afghan civil society should consider options 
for assisting in the evidence collection process for 
civil suits. Support could be provided, for example, 
to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission (AIHRC) in pursuing such efforts. 
Article 24 of the AIHRC law empowers the AIHRC 
to collect evidence about human rights violations. 
While Article 25 of the AIHRC law prohibits any 
other agencies from coercing the AIHRC into 
disclosing evidence, there does not seem to 
be a restriction on voluntary disclosure of such 
evidence.161 The AIHRC, consequently, could assist 
victims by providing evidence that will be necessary 
to succeed in civil suits against human rights 
violators.
Finally, many Afghans are concerned that even 
if the willingness and ability to file civil suits exist, 
the court system still is so corrupt that filing such 
suits is a hopeless cause. International actors and 
Afghan civil society can pursue a range of oversight 
and transparency initiatives to publicize the 
activities of the judiciary. Civil actions alone may 
face significant challenges because of problems in 
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the judiciary, but if properly combined with other 
publicity and information initiatives, progress may 
be possible.
ii. Enabling an International Forum 
In the course of my work in Afghanistan, I also 
learned that many Afghans would be willing to 
take a claim to the UN, or some other independent 
body, if Afghan institutions failed to provide 
justice. Problematically, while Afghanistan is party 
to many treaties for which such independent 
adjudicatory bodies exist, it has not signed the 
necessary protocols to allow Afghan citizens to 
bring claims in such bodies. International actors 
and Afghan civil society should recommend that 
Afghanistan sign additional protocols, or make 
necessary declarations, to enable Afghan citizens to 
bring claims before the UN. A list of recommended 
actions relating to treaties to which Afghanistan 
already has acceded includes:
UÊ Ê-}ÊÌiÊÀÃÌÊ"«Ì>Ê*ÀÌVÊÌÊÌiÊ
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)
UÊ Ê-}ÊÌiÊ"«Ì>Ê*ÀÌVÊÌÊÌiÊ
ÛiÌÊ
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW)
UÊ Ê>iÊÌiÊiViÃÃ>ÀÞÊ`iV>À>ÌÊÕ`iÀÊÀÌViÊ
22 of the Convention Against Torture (CAT)
UÊ Ê>iÊÌiÊiViÃÃ>ÀÞÊ`iV>À>ÌÊÕ`iÀÊ
Article 14 of the Convention Against Racial 
Discrimination (CERD)
Conclusion
This article has argued that nations have strategic, 
moral, and legal obligations to create rule of law 
structures in post-conflict states. Such structures 
are necessary for securing the local population, 
building strong local government, and enabling 
the entrepreneurial growth that is essential to 
economic expansion.
With respect to the strategic and moral 
obligations, this paper has argued that a transition 
gap occurs where rule of law is not enforced, 
and this gap allows for illicit power structures 
to erode host government institutions in a 
way that is contrary to the overall objectives of 
counterinsurgency. From a legal perspective, it 
has sought to establish that stabilizing forces have 
an obligation to ensure and respect the rights to 
life, privacy, property, and bodily integrity of host 
country citizens. This obligation must be embraced 
in occupation settings as part of a comprehensive 
reading of IHL and HRL. Finally, this paper has 
argued that international diplomats must clearly 
authorize law enforcement activities during 
interventions, and intervening forces should use 
local laws to empower host country citizens to hold 
their governments accountable.
Ultimately, while these increased obligations do 
put added burdens on stabilizing forces, this paper 
has sought to place the burden of clear thought 
and sufficient resourcing on the policymakers 
who choose to intervene. To date, the West does 
not have an acceptable track record of properly 
addressing post-conflict corruption and criminality. 
Unfortunately, in a world of weak states and 
powerful non-state forces, there are bound to be 
more opportunities on the horizon that will provide 
further tests of our ability to learn from these 
mistakes. We owe it to our own forces, and to the 
people of destabilized societies, to properly plan for 
the peace.
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